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Abstract—In this paper, the production decisions across mul-
tiple energy suppliers in smart grid, powering cellular networks
are investigated. The suppliers are characterized by different
offered prices and pollutant emissions levels. The challenge is
to decide the amount of energy provided by each supplier to
each of the operators such that their profitability is maximized
while respecting the maximum tolerated level of CO2 emissions.
The cellular operators are characterized by their offered quality
of service (QoS) to the subscribers and the number of users
that determines their energy requirements. Stochastic geometry
is used to determine the average power needed to achieve the
target probability of coverage for each operator. The total average
power requirements of all networks are fed to an optimization
framework to find the optimal amount of energy to be provided
from each supplier to the operators. The generalized alpha-
fair utility function is used to avoid production bias among the
suppliers based on profitability of generation. Results illustrate
the production behavior of the energy suppliers versus QoS level,
cost of energy, capacity of generation, and level of fairness.
Index Terms—Cellular networks, demand response, smart
grid, stochastic geometry.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cellular networks have seen an enormous growth in the
number of connected subscribers, particularly after the advent
of smart phones and 3G/4G mobile broadband technologies.
To cater for the existing, as well as future communication
requirements of emerging wireless technologies such as the 5G
and internet of things (IoT), there is a need for massive net-
work deployment, i.e., base stations (BSs) to increase network
capacity of cellular operators [1]. This will lead to a surge
in the energy consumption of cellular networks and hence,
negative environmental impact in the form of pollutant gases
emissions mainly carbon dioxide (CO2). It is estimated that
the carbon footprint of wireless communications could almost
triple in 2020 if no actions are taken [2]. In order to counter the
increasing carbon footprint of cellular networks, steps must be
taken to limit the pollutant emissions by incorporating green
renewable sources of energy alongside conventional fossil fuel
energy generation. Moreover, effective energy management
techniques are required in order to achieve the goal of reducing
CO2 emissions.
The development of the smart grid, a modern electricity
grid that allows integration of energy generated from different
sources, has enabled intelligent energy management both at the
demand and supply side. The smart grid comprises of multiple
energy suppliers, some of which provide renewable energy.
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The demand side management (DSM) in smart grid powered
cellular networks allows operators to make profitable and
environment-friendly energy procurement decisions according
to the changes in price or carbon footprint of the energy [3].
On the other hand, an increase in energy demand from the
side of cellular operators requires a decision at the smart grid
level about the quantity of energy provided by the suppliers
to the cellular operators and the price of energy. This is also
known as demand response management (DRM) [4].
The objective of DRM is to determine the average amount of
energy to be produced by each supplier in smart grid such that
the profit of the suppliers is maximized while respecting the
CO2 emissions threshold set by the regulatory authority. For
this, an accurate estimate of the total energy requirements of
the cellular operators is required, that depends on the quality
of their transmissions and the number of subscribers using
their services. The average radiated power of BSs of each
operator is the most crucial component in determining the
total power consumption. Stochastic Geometry (SG) [5] is
employed to estimate the transmit power required by operators
to provide their subscribers with a certain quality of service
(QoS) level. SG allows the computation of important network
statistics such as the probability of coverage (or outage) as
spatial averages [6]. Since cellular networks involve BSs and
users which can be modeled as points from a particular
point process, we can use SG for performance analysis of
such networks. The Poisson point process (PPP), which is
well known for its analytical tractability, is used to model
the location of operator BSs and subscribers. The resulting
analysis enables us to ensure that, on average, any user in the
network is served with a predefined QoS and to determine the
corresponding power requirements.
Existing works on DRM in smart grid deal with capacity
planning by a single energy supplier in response to the
changes in the energy demand of generic consumers [4]. Real-
time pricing in smart grid with demand of the consumers is
investigated in [7]. Most of the previous works are based on
DRM for general electricity consumers. Few works have dealt
with smart grid DRM for cellular networks. However, they
are based on instantaneous network statistics [8], [9] without
considering fairness in the supply decision. In this paper,
a generalized α-fairness-based DRM framework for cellular
networks is proposed using average network statistics provided
by SG. The system model comprises a set of cellular operators,
characterized by the offered QoS to their subscribers, powered
by a common pool of energy suppliers. SG is exploited to
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evaluate the total power requirements of the cellular networks.
Then, closed-form expressions for the amount of energy
provided by each supplier to the operators are derived while
respecting the maximum tolerated CO2 emissions level set
by the environmental regulator. A generalized α-fair utility
function based on the profit of energy suppliers is used to avoid
production bias towards any single supplier. The optimization
is performed while taking into account the production capacity
of each supplier, their cost of generation, the dynamic pricing
strategy, and the pollutant emissions levels. Simulation results
investigate the energy suppliers’ behaviors according to dif-
ferent system parameters. Also, the obtained results show that
suppliers’ production decisions are adapted to the changing
demand of cellular networks to achieve maximum profitability
in an environment-friendly manner.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Geometry
The network consists of Nop mobile operators serving
their subscribers in an area of A km2. The BSs of each
mobile operator l = 1, . . . , Nop are randomly deployed in R2
according to a homogeneous PPP denoted by Φ(l) with density
λ
(l)
BS BS/km
2. The total number of BSs that belong to each
operator is N (l)BS = λ
(l)
BSA. Each mobile operator uses frequency
reuse within its network to avoid adjacent cell interference.
The set of BSs using the same frequency are, therefore,
separated by a certain exclusion distance denoted by R. The
location of the interfering BSs of each operator are modeled
by the Mate´rn hard core point process (MHCPP) obtained via
a dependent thinning of the original PPP. No two selected
BSs in the MHCPP are closer than the exclusion distance.
This new set is denoted by Φ˜(l) ⊆ Φ(l) (see [10] for details).
For tractability of analysis, the MHCPP is approximated by
an equi-dense PPP. The intensity of the MHCPP is evaluated
as Λ(l)BS =
1−e−λ
(l)
BS piR
2
piR2 , [11]. The subscribers of operator l are
uniformly distributed in R2 with density λ(l)u users/km2. Each
user is associated to its nearest BS and, hence, the coverage
regions of BSs form a Voronoi tessellation [6]. The number
of users served by each BS of operator l are evaluated as
N (l)u = λ(l)u A/N (l)BS .
B. Operator Characteristics
In this framework, each mobile operator is characterized
by the offered QoS, determined by the downlink signal-
to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) thresholds T (l) and
the probability of coverage P(l) for l = 1, . . . , Nop. The
assumption is that a user connected to the BS of operator l, is
served only if the downlink SINR at the user exceeds the pre-
defined threshold T (l). To ensure that each operator meets the
set transmission quality standards, the transmit power levels of
its BSs need to be adjusted. The total transmit power from all
the BSs determines the energy requirements of the operator.
C. Channel Model
It is assumed that the BSs of operator l transmit with
an average power denoted by P (l)t for l = 1, . . . , Nop to
serve a single user. The power decays with the distance
according to the power law and, hence, the received power
at a test user located at the origin from a BS located at xj is
given as, P (l)r = P
(l)
t h
(l)
j ‖x(l)j ‖−η , where h(l)j represents the
channel fast fading effect and is assumed to be independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) exponential random variables
with mean µ−1 for each j, l, ‖.‖ represents the vector norm,
and η is the path-loss exponent. Without loss of generality, it
is assumed that the effects of shadowing are catered for by
the randomness of the BS locations. The downlink SINR at a
typical user located at the origin served by operator l can be
expressed as:
SINR(l) =
P
(l)
t h
(l)
0 r
(l)−η
σ2 +
∑
j∈Φ˜(l)\0
P
(l)
t h
(l)
j ‖x(l)j ‖−η
, (1)
where h(l)0 and r
(l) are the channel fading and the distance
between the test user and the nearest BS of operator l, respec-
tively, and σ2 is the Gaussian noise power. The interference
power denoted by I(l)agg is
∑
j∈Φ˜(l)\0
P
(l)
t h
(l)
j ‖x(l)j ‖−η , where
Φ˜(l)\0 denotes the set of BSs of operator l excluding the BS
closest to the considered user.
D. Power Consumption Model for Mobile Operators
Each BS of operator l is considered to be equipped with a
single omni-directional antenna. Its average power consump-
tion, denoted by P (l)BS , is expressed as follows [12]:
P
(l)
BS = aP
(l)
tx + b, (2)
where P (l)tx is the average power radiated by each BS of opera-
tor l. The coefficient a corresponds to the power consumption
that scales with the radiated power due to amplifier and feeder
losses. The term b models an offset of BS site power which
is consumed independently of the average transmit power and
is due to signal processing, battery backup, and cooling. P (l)tx
can be evaluated as P (l)tx = P
(l)
t N (l)u .
E. Energy Pricing and Environmental Impact
In this study, it is assumed that the cellular networks are
powered by a smart grid where NR different sources exist to
supply energy with different prices and have different pollutant
levels depending on the nature of the generated energy. The
suppliers use a dynamic pricing strategy, whereby, the unit
charge of supplied energy depends directly on the energy
demand. In order to increase production, an energy supplier
needs to employ additional infrastructure and resources, thus
bearing additional expenses. Therefore, the price of energy
from supplier n charged to operator l, denoted by pi(n,l), is
expressed in monetary units (MU) as follows:
pi(n,l) = w(n)
(
q(n,l)
Q¯(n)
)γ(n)
, (3)
where w(n) is the benchmark price charged per unit by supplier
n, q(n,l) is the average energy provided by supplier n to
operator l, Q¯(n) is the maximum generation capacity of each
supplier, and γ(n) is a non-negative integer representing the
price sensitivity of supplier n. If γ(n) = 0, the dynamic pricing
is ignored and the suppliers charge a fixed price for energy
independently of the quantity purchased. Otherwise, the price
increases with the demand and vice versa.
The suppliers have different environmental impacts in terms
of CO2 emissions depending on the quantity and type of
energy generated. This can be quantified using the following
pollutant emissions function F (see [12]):
F(q(n,l)) = ψn
Nop∑
l=1
(
q(n,l)
)2
+ φn
Nop∑
l=1
q(n,l), (4)
where ψn and φn are the pollutant emissions coefficients of
supplier n.
III. METHODOLOGY OF ANALYSIS
In this section, the probability of coverage for a typical user
in the network of operator l is determined using analytical
tools from SG. This helps us in identifying the transmit
power requirements of each operator to meet the transmission
quality standards and, hence, determining the average power
consumption of the operators. Consequently, an optimization
framework is developed to supply the required energy from the
smart grid in an environment-friendly yet profitable manner.
A. Operator Coverage Analysis
SG is employed to evaluate the probability that a typical
user of operator l is covered by the cellular network. The
coverage is defined as the probability that the received SINR
per user exceeds a target service threshold T (l). In other words,
it corresponds to the complementary cumulative distribution
function (ccdf) of the SINR, denoted by P(l), evaluated as
P(l) = P[SINR(l) > T (l)] and it can be expressed as [6]:
P(l)(P (l)t , T (l)) =
∞∫
0
2pirλ
(l)
BSe
−λ(l)BS pir2e
−µT (l)σ2rη
P
(l)
t ×
e−Λ(l)BS piT (l)2/ηr2
∞∫
T (l)
−2/η
1
1+uη/2
du
 dr.
(5)
Note that the probability of coverage depends on the trans-
mitted power and the target SINR threshold of each operator.
Therefore, for a fixed P(l), the transmit power can be com-
promised to achieve a higher SINR threshold and vice versa.
B. Problem Formulation and Solution
The decision on production quantity by the suppliers is
based on their profitability as well as the CO2 emissions.
The profitability of the suppliers depends on the quantity of
energy supplied to mobile operators Q, where Q is a matrix
of size NR × Nop with elements q(n,l) ∀ n = 1, . . . , NR, l =
1, . . . , Nop, the per unit price of energy set by suppliers pi(n,l),
and the per unit cost of generation c(n). The profit of supplier
n can be expressed as follows:
Πn(Q) =
Nop∑
l=1
q(n,l)
(
pi(n,l) − c(n)
)
, ∀ n = 1, . . . , NR. (6)
The environment friendliness of the suppliers is determined
by the pollutant emissions levels that depend on the amount
of energy supplied. It is quantified by the cost function
C(Q) =
NR∑
n=1
F(q(n,l)). In order to reduce pollutant emissions,
the smart grid needs to produce more green energy from re-
newable sources while curtailing the use of fossil fuel sources.
However, the renewable energy generation might be expensive
and/or limited in amount and therefore, may lead to lower
profitability for the suppliers. Hence, the suppliers use multiple
energy sources depending on their cost, available amount,
and environmental impact in order to increase their revenues
while respecting the maximum tolerated CO2 emissions level
imposed by the regulator.
The objective now is to solve a constrained optimization
problem which results in an optimal matrix Q∗ that maximizes
a utility U based on the vector Π = [Π1,Π2, . . . ,ΠNR ]
containing the individual profits of the energy suppliers. The
optimization problem is expressed as follows:
maximize
Q
U(Π) (7)
subject to
Nop∑
l=1
N
(l)
BS q
(n,l) ≤ Q¯n, ∀ n = 1, . . . , NR, (8)
NR∑
n=1
q(n,l) = N
(l)
BS (a P
(l)
t N
(l)
u + b)τ,∀ l = 1, . . . , Nop, (9)
C(Q) ≤ Cth. (10)
The constraint (8) enforces the total amount of energy pro-
duced by a supplier n not to exceed its maximum energy
production capacity Q¯n. Assuming that there are no losses,
the average energy provided by the suppliers should be equal
to the total power consumption of all BSs of operator l during
its operation time τ , as indicated in constraint (9). The total
transmit power for each operator P (l)t can be obtained by
solving (5) for a fixed QoS requirement P(l). As the expression
of P(l) involves computation of a complicated integral which
does not have a closed form, it is solved numerically using
Newton’s method to obtain P (l)t , ∀l. In constraint (10), a
restriction is imposed on the pollutant emissions due to energy
consumption. This forces the suppliers to produce more green
energy to remain within regulated limits, denoted by Cth.
C. Utility Function
Since the objective is to determine the optimal amount
of energy provided by the suppliers in the smart grid to
multiple mobile operators, a fair power sharing framework
needs to be introduced. Therefore, a unified mathematical
formulation for power allocation known as α-fairness is used,
where the parameter α determines the degree of fairness of
profit distribution among the operators [13]. The generalized
α-fairness utility function of the supplier profits is defined as
follows:
U(Π) =

NR∑
n=1
Π1−αn
1−α , if α ≥ 0, α 6= 1,
NR∑
n=1
log(Πn), if α = 1.
(11)
The parameter α controls the tradeoff between the efficiency
as well as the fairness in energy provided by the suppliers to
the operators. In other words, the framework tends to avoid
unfair allocation of energy depending on the value of α. For
example, situations where the suppliers only supply the most
expensive energy to meet the demand in order to achieve
maximum profit. In the special cases, when α = 0, 1,∞, the
utility reduces to the sum, proportional fair and max-min fair
utility, respectively. These cases are described as follows:
Sum Utility (α = 0): The utility of this metric is equivalent
to the sum of the profits of the energy suppliers (U(Π) =
NR∑
n=1
Πn). This approach promotes suppliers with higher profit
margins by offering them the possibility to supply the most
expensive energy to the operators at the least cost via smart
grid to maximize their profits. On the other hand, suppliers
with lower energy price will be deprived from the possibility
to sell the cheapest energy as their profits are already low.
Proportional fair utility (α = 1): The proportional fair metric
maximizes the sum of the log of the profit of suppliers. It is
equivalent to the maximization of the geometric mean of the
profits Πn i.e. (U(Π) = (
∏NR
n=1 Πn)
1/NR), which is equivalent
to (U(Π) = ∑NRn=1 ln(Πn)). The proportional fair (PF) metric
is fairer since an energy supplier with a profit close to zero will
make the entire utility go to zero. Hence, this metric avoids
having a very low profit for any of the suppliers. In addition, it
reasonably promotes suppliers with good profit margins since
a high profit will contribute in increasing the product.
Max-Min Utility (α→∞): Max-Min utilities are a family of
utility functions attempting to maximize the minimum profit
among all energy suppliers: U(Π) = min
n
(Πn). By increasing
the priority of suppliers having lower profit margins, Max-
Min utilities lead to more fairness in the system. In order to
simplify the problem for this approach, a new decision variable
Πmin = min
n
(Πn) is introduced. Therefore, the optimization
problem becomes:
maximize
Q,Πmin
Πmin (12)
subject to (8), (9) and (10), (13)
Πn ≥ Πmin,∀n = 1, . . . , NR. (14)
D. Solution
The optimization problem presented in eqs. (7) to (10) can
be solved for special cases using the Lagrangian method [14]
exploiting its strong duality property as follows:
minimize
δ≥0
maximize
Q≥0
L(Q, δ, ξ, ζ), (15)
where L(Q, δ, ξ, ζ) is the Lagrangian, δ = [δ1, . . . , δNR ],
ξ = [ξ1, . . . , ξNop ], and ζ are the Lagrange multipliers cor-
responding to the constraints in (8), (9), and (10) respectively.
Deriving the optimal amount of energy for a general value of
α is highly elaborate and is left for future work. The closed
form expressions for the special cases, i.e., α = 0, 1,∞ are
provided here. However, the investigation of the performance
for different values of α is done via simulations in Section IV.
For the case of Sum utility, i.e., α = 0, the optimal amount
of energy supplied by supplier n to operator l, q(n,l)∗ is:
q(n,l)∗ =

1
2ζψnN
(l)
BS
(
w(n) − c(n) − δnN (l)BS − ζφnN (l)BS + ξl
)
,
if γn = 0,
1
2
(
ζψnN
(l)
BS −w
(n)
Q¯n
) (−c(n) − δnN (l)BS − ζφnN (l)BS + ξl) ,
if γn = 1.
(16)
We can deduce that q(n,l)∗ is inversely proportional to the
coefficient related to CO2 emissions of energy supplier n i.e.,
ζ. The Sum utility depends on the prices charged by the
suppliers where the higher the price, the higher the amount
of energy supplied from that source.
For the case of Proportional fair utility, i.e., α = 1, the
optimal amount of energy supplied by supplier n to operator
l is given as follows:
q(n,l)∗ =

1
2ζψnN
(l)
BS
( (
w(n) − c(n)) NR∏
m=1
m6=n
Πm − δnN (l)BS−
ζφnN
(l)
BS + ξl
)
, if γn = 0,
1
2w(n)
Q¯n
NR∏
m=1
m 6=n
Πm−2ζψnN(l)BS
(
c(n)
NR∏
m=1
m 6=n
Πm + δnN
(l)
BS +
ζφnN
(l)
BS − ξl
)
, if γn = 1.
(17)
The supplied energy q(n,l)∗ depends directly on the product
of other supplier profits i.e., Πm. Hence, this approach avoids
having any supplier with very low profit and maximizes the
product of all suppliers profits simultaneously.
For the case of Max-Min fair utility, i.e., α → ∞, the
optimal amount of energy supplied by supplier n to operator
l is given as follows:
q(n,l)∗ =

1
2ζψnN
(l)
BS
(
θn(w
(n) − c(n))− δnN (l)BS − ζφnN (l)BS + ξl
)
,
if γn = 0,
1
2
(
ζψnN
(l)
BS −w
(n)
Q¯n
θn
) (c(n)θn + δnN (l)BS + ζφnN (l)BS − ξl) ,
if γn = 1.
(18)
θn are the additional Lagrange multipliers corresponding to
(14). By taking the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect
to Πmin, we can deduce that
∑NR
n=1 θn = 1. By comparing
with (16), we can notice that θn control the priority of the
energy supply according to the profitability of the suppliers.
Note that if a fixed pricing strategy is used, i.e., γn = 0, the
amount of energy supplied is directly proportional to the price
of energy, whereas for dynamic pricing strategy, the amount
of energy supplied is inversely related to the price of energy.
This is because the energy price increases with demand under
dynamic pricing policy. Hence, the amount supplied should
decrease with increasing price.
The optimal Lagrange multipliers δ∗, ξ∗, ζ∗ and θ∗n can
be obtained using the subgradient method (see [15]) or other
heuristic approaches. In order to achieve the optimal solution,
we can start with random initial values of the Lagrange
multipliers and evaluate the corresponding amount of energy.
Then, we update the Lagrange multipliers at the next iteration
with a step size updated according to the non-summable
diminishing step length policy. The values of the optimal
amount of energy supplied and the Lagrange multipliers are
updated until convergence.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
A cellular network with Nop = 3, denoted by Op. 1, Op.
2 and Op. 3, is considered. The BSs of each operator are
distributed uniformly in R2 according to PPPs with BS density
λ
(1)
BS = λ
(2)
BS = λ
(3)
BS = (pi(200)
2)−1 BS/m2 respectively. The
simulation area A is chosen to be a square region of side 10
km2 in R2. The subscribers of the operators are also uniformly
distributed in the simulation area with intensity λ(1)u = 15
users/km2, λ(2)u = 30 users/km2, and λ
(3)
u = 40 users/km2.
The channel is assumed to experience exponential fading with
a mean channel gain µ = 1. The operators are differentiated
by the offered SINR levels and the QoS. The SINR levels
offered by the three operators are T (1) = 15 dB, T (2) = 10
dB, and T (3) = 5 dB while the QoS requirements are specified
as P(1) = 0.7, P(2) = 0.8, and P(3) = 0.9. Without loss of
generality, the BS operation time τ is set to be 1 s.
All BSs use the same power model [12] with a = 7.84 and
b = 71.5. The path loss exponent η = 4 and the noise power
is σ2 = −115 dB. The BSs procure energy from a smart grid
in which there are several available energy suppliers offering
different prices and CO2 emissions levels. It is assumed that
there are three available energy suppliers (i.e., NR = 3),
namely; Sup. 1, Sup. 2, and Sup. 3. They are characterized as
follows: Sup. 1 provides the cheapest energy at a benchmark
price of w(1) = 1 MU but with the highest carbon footprint,
i.e., pollutant coefficients ψ1 = 0.004 and φ1 = 0.001, Sup.
2 provides energy with an intermediate benchmark price and
lower carbon footprint (w(2) = 2 MU, ψ2 = 0.002, φ2 =
0.0005), and Sup. 3 offers clean but expensive energy (i.e.,
w(3) = 3 MU, ψ3 = 0, φ3 = 0.0001). The maximum CO2
emissions level is taken as Cth = 107 kg/h. The costs of energy
production for the suppliers is c(1) = 0.1 MU, c(2) = 0.5 MU,
and c(3) = 2.5 MU. The base profit margin of the suppliers
is, therefore, 0.9 MU, 1.5 MU and 0.5 MU, respectively. Each
supplier has a maximum energy production capacity which is
assumed to be equal (i.e., Q¯1 = Q¯2 = Q¯3 = 150 kJ), unless
otherwise stated.
The objective is to study the behavior of the system while
changing system parameters and thresholds. Fig. 1 plots the
price of energy charged to operators and the total energy
consumed by the operators versus the SINR threshold of Op.
1. For ease of exposition, NR = 2, i.e., Sup. 1 and Sup.
3, is used in Fig. 1. We set γn = 1, which means that the
dynamic pricing is in effect, and α = 0, which means that
the Sum utility is used. It can be observed from Fig. 1(a),
that an increase in transmission quality standards of a mobile
operator increases its energy consumption due to additional
transmit power required. This increased demand triggers a
response from the suppliers as shown in Fig. 1(b). Since Op. 3
is the most power hungry operator, it is provided with the most
expensive energy followed by Op. 2 and Op. 1, respectively.
Op. 1 and Op. 2 are completely powered by the cheapest
energy supplier with high carbon footprint while Op. 3 is
powered by both suppliers. As the power requirements of
Op. 1 increase, its price also increases due to the dynamic
pricing policy. To supply more energy to Op. 1 from Sup. 1,
the framework progressively cuts down the energy supplied
by Sup. 1 to Op. 3 and increases the energy supplied by Sup.
2 to Op. 3. As soon as CO2 emissions threshold is reached,
Op. 3 suffers further by completely being supplied by Op.
2 with very expensive energy. Further increase in demand is
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Fig. 1: Price of energy charged by suppliers to operators and the total
energy consumed by operators versus SINR threshold of Op. 1. The
simulation parameters are: α = 0, γ1 = γ2 = 1, Q¯1 = Q¯2 = 170
kJ, Cth = 4.5× 107 kg/h.
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Fig. 2: Profit of energy suppliers versus SINR threshold of Op. 1.
compensated by providing Op. 2 with more green expensive
energy. Finally, the framework shows an abrupt change in
the production decision after T1 = 14.8 dB. This is because
Op. 1 becomes the most power hungry operator as evident
from Fig. 1(a). Therefore, it starts to receive green expensive
energy and less cheap energy. The results in Fig. 1 motivate
the introduction of fairness to the framework to avoid price
exploitation of any single operator.
In the sequel, the price sensitivity of suppliers γn = 0,∀n =
1, . . . , NR and α = 0.5 is used unless otherwise stated. Fig. 2
plots the profit of the suppliers against the SINR threshold of
Op. 1 for extreme values of α. It can be observed that for
α = 0, i.e., Sum utility case, all the additional share of profit
is received by Sup. 1 since it has the lowest profit among
the suppliers. However, for α = ∞, i.e, Max-Min fair case,
operator 2 already receives a higher profit and the additional
share of the profit is given to Sup. 2 and Sup. 3.
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Fig. 3: Energy production by suppliers and profit of suppliers versus
production cost of Sup. 3 for α = 0.5.
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Fig. 4: Profit of energy suppliers versus the fairness level α.
In Fig. 3(a), the impact of increasing the cost of energy
production of Sup. 3 on the amount of energy produced by
the suppliers is studied for T1 = 15 dB. It can be observed that
increasing the cost of production reduces the profit margin of
Sup. 3, thus leading to a reduction in its energy production.
In order to meet the same energy demand, the production of
Sup. 2 increases since Sup. 2 has the highest profit margin.
An increase in the production of Sup. 1 is also observed
since the fairness level α = 0.5 does not allow any single
supplier to exploit the demand. The corresponding profit of
the suppliers is shown in Fig. 3(b). It is shown that the Sup.
3 profit is linearly falling as the cost increases while there
is a gentle increase in Sup. 1 and Sup. 2 profits due to
increased production.
Finally, in Fig. 4, the effect of the fairness level α on the
the profits of the suppliers is demonstrated. It is apparent
that Sup. 2 achieves the highest profit due to its high profit
margin followed by Sup. 3 and Sup. 1 in order of their profit
margins. As α is increased, the distribution of profits among
the three suppliers becomes fairer. Particularly, when α = 0,
the distribution of profit is biased. The supplier with the
highest profit margin, i.e., Sup. 2 receives the highest share
and the supplier with the lowest profit margin, i.e., Sup. 1
receives the lowest share. For α = 1, i.e., Proportional fair,
the distribution of profits is according to the profit margins,
however, the discrepancy is smaller. As α is increased, the
share of the profits equalizes further to increase fairness.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a fair and optimized framework is proposed
for energy production decisions made by suppliers in the smart
grid powering cellular networks. Multiple energy suppliers
are available in smart grid offering different energy prices
and pollutant emissions. The goal is to first assess the power
requirements of the mobile operators, for a given quality
of transmission and the number of subscribers. Then, the
framework needs to meet these requirements by intelligently
providing energy from different suppliers in order to maximize
the profitability of the suppliers. Stochastic geometry is used
to quantify the network performance from the perspective of a
typical user in terms of the average transmission power of the
networks. It is observed that using the proposed framework,
suppliers adapts their energy production decisions under dif-
ferent situations such that the CO2 emissions levels of the
network do not exceed the set threshold and generate the
optimal amount of energy for maximum profitability.
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